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THE INDIAN PROBLEM AND THE LAW
RAY A. BROWN
When the first settlers from Europe arrived upon the North
American continent they were immediately presented with an
"Indian problem." This problem has been with them and their
descendants ever since, and to-day it is far from being solved.
It is true that at present it is not very pressing from the stand-
point of the dominant white race. Most of the Indians' pos-
sessions of value have passed into our hands, and dangers from
hostile uprisings have long since passed into history. Looking
at the situation through the eyes of the Indian, however, it is
doubtful whether his condition at any time has been as critical
as it is to-day. His ancient heritage is in the hands of others,
his customary mode of life is largely impossible, and even the
means of subsistence, which he and his ancestors possessed, have
vanished. Not having yet achieved the education and the eco-
nomic competence necessary to survive in the struggle for exist-
ence with his non-Indian neighbors, he, and with him the Ameri-
can people, squarely face the issue whether he shall sink into
the disease, poverty, and crime ridden stratum of society, or
whether he shall survive as a respectable and self sustained part
of our society.
There are indications that this question has at last penetrated
the public conscience. Sensational magazine literature,' a
Senatorial investigation, 2 and the appointment as Indian Com-
missioner and Assistant of two prominent Philadelphia business
men,3 long interested philanthropically in the Indian, have
served to turn attention to the government's Indian wards. The
problem to-day is one of race conservation and advancement.
:See Collier, Are We Making Red Slaves? Survey, Jan. 1, 1927; Connolly,
Gvj of a Broken People, Good Housekeeping, Feb., March, May, 1929.
2 Not yet completed. See address of Senator Wheeler of the Committee,
U. S. Daily, Aug. 13, 1929.
Charles J. Rhoads and J. Henry Scattergood.
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It is therefore, in large part, a problem for the physician, edu-
cator, and social worker. In it, however, there inhere certain
fundamental and unique legal problems, an understanding and
solution of which will be necessary before a satisfactory future
for the Indian people can safely be predicted.'
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AMONG THE INDIANS
One of the most interesting and important of the Indian's
legal piroblems is that of providing for him a rational and appro-
priate system of civil and criminal law. At present there is
great doubt and uncertainty, not merely whether in given cases
he is subject to the jurisdiction of the state or federal govern-
ment, but whether indeed he is subject to any law at all. The
principles on which the Indian's status rests were early enun-
ciated by Chief Justice Marshall in the well known cases of
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,5 and Worcester v. Georgia.6 In the
first of these the Cherokee Tribe was declared to be "a distinct
political society, separated from others, capable of managing its
own affairs, and of governing itself," but dependent neverthe-
less on the United States, to whom the relation therefore "re-
sembles that of a ward to his guardian." 7 This crystallized in
the Worcester case into the specific holding that the federal
government had jurisdiction, exclusive of the states, over the
Indian tribes, their territory, their persons and their property.
Criminal Justice
Around these cases has been built much of the juristic and
legislative structure of the law relating to the Indians. The
theory of tribal autonomy enunciated above was given Con-
gressional recognition in the act of 1834,8 which, while extend-
4 The material for the present article was gathered by the writer, who
was the legal specialist on the Indian Survey Staff of the Institute for
Government Research, which at the request of Mr. Hubert Work, then Sec-
retary of the Interior, made an exhaustive and scientific study into the
Indian problem in all its phases. See MERiAM, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION (1928).
5 5 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1831).
6 6 Pet. 515 (U. S. 1832).
7 See, to the same effect, United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 382,
6 Sup. Ct. 1109, 1113 (1886) ; United States v. Quiver, 241 U. S. 602, 603,
36 Sup. Ct. 699, 700 (1916).
8 4 STAT. 729, 733 (1834), 25 U. S. C. §§ 217, 218 (1926).
"At an early period it became the settled policy of Congress to permit
the personal and domestic relations of the Indians with each other to be
regulated, and offences by one Indian against the person or property of an-
other to be dealt with according to their tribal customs and laws." United
States v. Quiver, supra note 7, at 603.
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ing the federal criminal laws over the "Indian country," 0
exempted from such extension "crimes committed by one Indian
against the person or property of another Indian." 2o But with
the intrusion of white settlements, the breaking up of the reser-
vations, the crumbling of tribal authority, and the subsequent
entry of the Indian people into the economic and social life of
the surrounding communities, tribal autonomy in serious criminal
matters became impossible. It was necessary to extend over the
Indians the authority and law of the white man. By the act
of March 3, 1885,11 it was provided that all Indians committing
within the limits of an Indian reservation the crimes of murder,
manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, assault with a
dangerous weapon, arson, burglary, or larceny, whether against
the person or property of another Indian or of any other person,
should be subject to the same laws and tried in the same courts
as are all other persons committing gaid crimes within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the United States. This grant of juris-
9 The term "Indian country" was first defined by statute as including all
that part of the United States west of the Mississippi River, not within
Missouri, Arkansas, or Louisiana, to which the Indian title had not yet
been extinguished. While the definition has long since dropped out of
the statutes, the term "Indian country" yet remains.
It has been judicially determined to include Indian reservations, whether
originally Indian lands br whether created by executive order out of the
public domain. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 33 Sup. Ct. 449
(1913). And also Indian allotments in "open reservations" as long as
the United States retains an interest in them for the purpose of its
guardianship over its wards. United States v. Pelican, 232 U. S. 442, 34
Sup. Ct. 396 (1914).
lo In 1854 this exemption was further extended to include Indians who
had been "punished by the local law of the tribe." 10 STAT. 270 (1854), 25
U. S. C. § 218 (1926). This statute does not have the effect of extending
the federal laws over Indian reservations, where the alleged crime in no
way involves Indians themselves. So to extend the federal law would be
contrary to the equality of the states protected by the Constitution. The
subsequent admission of a state impliedly repeals the above statute pro
tanto. Cf. United States v. McBratney, 104 U. S. 621 (1881); Draper v.
United States, 164 U. S. 240, 17 Sup. Ct. 107 (1896) (both cases of murder
where neither the accused nor his victim were Indians). But when the
crime is committed by a white man against the person or property of an
Indian the federal jurisdiction attaches, for the Indians are wards of the
United States, and remain under its protection in spite of the state
sovereignty. Donnelly v. United States; United States v. Pelican, both
supra note 9.
In a few cases the United States at the time of the creation of a state
has specificially reserved to it jurisdiction over the Indian reservation in-
cluding non-Indians, but it requires a very clear expression of this intent
for the Court to allow the jurisdiction. Cf. The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall.
737 (U. S. 1867); Hollister v. United States, 145 Fed. 773 (C. C. A. 8th,
1906); United States v. McBratney; Draper v. United States, both supra.
1123 STAT. 385 (1885), 18 U. S. C. § 548 (1926).
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diction was sustained in the case of United States v. Kagam 12
by reliance on the federal government's guardianship over the
Indian people. It is apparent, however, that as a criminal code
for the Indians, the above legislation is very incomplete. Such
offences as assault with intent to rape, incest, adultery, embezzle-
ment, to mention only a few, are not covered by the statute.
As to these the federal courts lack jurisdiction." It is also plain
both from a wording of the statute and from a decent regard
for state sovereignty that the federal court's jurisdiction extends
no further than the boundaries of the reservations. 14
As to state jurisdiction over Indian crimes, it includes those
of all descriptions committed by the Indians off their reserva-
tions.15 As to crimes committed on the reservations, there is
some conflict in the cases, but the majority view, influenced by
the tendency of the state prosecutors and courts to evade rather
than seek responsibility, is that the federal authority is exclusive.
This view is supported with respect to the eight crimes enumer-
ated in the federal statute in a dictum by the United States
Supreme Court," which the state courts have not been loath to
accept."i Also, where the alleged crime is not included within
this federal list, the better opinion undoubtedly is that expressed
by the Minnesota court as follows:
"By the act of 1885, presumably, Congress has enumerated all
the acts which in their judgment ought to be made crimes when
committed by the Indians, in view of their imperfect civilization.
For the state to be allowed to supplement this by making every
act a crime on their part which would be such if committed by
a member of our more highly civilized society would be not only
I2Supra note 7.
13 United States v. Quiver, supra note 7 (adultery); United States v.
King, 81 Fed. 625 (E. D. Wis. 1897) (assault with intent to rape); Ex
parte Hart, 157 Fed. 130 (D. Ore. 1907) (incest).
These decisions are based partly on the exception in 25 U. S. C. §§ 217,
218, supra note 8, and partly on the theory of tribal autonomy. In United
States v. Quiver it was argued that the crime of adultery did not come
within the statutory exception since not committed agains t the person or
property of another, but was a voluntary act. The Court refused to give
this narrow construction, saying that it was the intent of Congress "that
the relations of the Indians among themselves-the conduct of one towards
another-is to be controlled by the customs and laws of the tribe, save
when Congress expressly or clearly directs otherwise."
14 Pablo v. People, 23 Colo. 134, 46 Pac. 636 (1896); State v. Spotted
Hawk, 22 Mont. 33, 55 Pac. 1026 (1899); State v. Tilden, 27 Idaho 262,
147 Pac. 1056 (1915); State v. Buckaroo Jack, 30 Nev. 325, 96 Pac. 497
(1908) ; State -v. Superior Court, 107 Wash. 238, 181 Pac. 688 (1919).
15 See cases supra note 14.
36 See United States v. Kagama, supra note 7, at 383.
17 Ex parte Cross, 20 Neb. 417, 30 N. W. 428 (1886) ; State v. Howard, 33
Wash. 250, 74 Pac. 382 (1903); State v. Columbia George, 39 Ore. 127, 65
Pac. 604 (1901); cf. Ex parte Van Moore, 221 Fed. 954 (D. S. D. 1915).
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inappropriate, but also practically to arrogate the guardianship
over these Indians, which is exclusively invested in the general
government." ,'
This division of authority between federal and state govern-
ments, giving rise to doubts and conflicts in any event, is ren-
dered even more confusing by the process through which the
Indian reservations have been allotted in severalty to the mem-
bers of the tribes occupying them, and as a result of which the
Indians themselves have been started on the way to full freedom
from federal control. In the first place, land allotted to the In-
dians, though in severalty, is still considered "Indian country,"
or an "Indian reservation," within the statutes2t1 and decisions
above outlined, so long as the United States retains title as
trustee, which is normally twenty-five years. These Indian allot-
ments have in time become interspersed with the holdings of
white settlers, thus creating a confusion of jurisdictions which
has been aptly described as "government in spots." 20 On the
personal side, all Indians receiving allotments were by the orig-
inal act of 1887 21 expressly declared to "have the benefit of and
be subject to the laws both criminal and civic of the State or
Territory in which they may reside," and in addition, if born
within the United States, to be citizens thereof.2 2 By subsequent
28 Minnesota v. Campbell, 53 Minn. 354, 359, 55 N. W. 553, 555 (1893).
A contrary view is expressed in Kitto v. State, 98 Neb. 164, 171, 152 N. W.
380, 383 (1915): "Congress has not reserved to the Federal Courts the
jurisdiction to punish for misdemeanors. If such jurisdiction is not vested
in the state courts, it is not vested anywhere and the perpetrator of mis-
demeanors of all kinds on an Indian reservation may go unpunished. Such
clearly was not the intention of Congress." See note to this case in L. R. A.
1915F 587. A recent case in accord with Minnesota v. Campbell is State
v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 243 Pac. 1067 (1926).
Two federal courts have spoken with decisive force to the effect that
the state game laws cannot be enforced against Indians on their reserva-
tions. In re Blackbird, 109 Fed. 139 (D. Wis. 1901); In re Lincoln, 129
Fed. 247 (N. D. Cal. 1904).
29 See supra notes 8 and 11.
2D See State v. Lott, 21 Idaho 646, 660, 123 Pac. 491, 496 (1912).
2124 STAT. 390 (1887), 8 U. S. C. § 3 (1926).
= In In re Heff, 197 U. S. 488, 25 Sup. Ct. 506 (1905), the Supreme
Court first held that the effect of this provision was to remove the allotted
Indian, whether his title was restricted or not, from federal guardianship
and place him as any other citizen under state law. While the case involved
the sale of liquor to an allotted Indian, the language of the Court was
such as to indicate that it was considered that the allotted Indian was
removed from the domain of the federal statutes specifically relating to
him as an Indian. A number of lesser courts so held. In re Now-Ge-Zhucl:,
69 Kan. 410, 76 Pac. 877 (1904); United States v. Kiya, 126 Fed. 879
(D. N. D. 1903); State v. Lott, supra note 20.
The Heff case was overruled in Hallowell v. United States, 221 U. S.
317, 31 Sup. Ct. 587 (1911), and in United States v. Nice, 241 U. S. 591,
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amendment, 3 however, the time of such subjection to state law
was postponed until the expiration of the federal trust period and
the grant of title in fee to the Indian. The mere fact of citizen-
ship, now conferred on all Indians born in the United States,2'
does not change their status under the rules we are now consider-
ing,25 but on the grant of the title in fee, the Indian does assume
the full rights and responsibilities of citizenship and is subject
like any other person to the laws of the state wherein he resides.20
It is apparent that there is a considerable hiatus in the crim-
inal laws relating to the Indians. This is partially filled by the
jurisdiction of the so-called Courts of Indian Offences, which are
presided over by Indian judges, appointed by the superintendents
of the respective reservations and responsible to them. But their
legal foundation is rather insecure, for their only Congressional
authority is the annual appropriations by Congress for the pay
of the judges, and the only judicial sanction is an early federal
decision of the district court for the state of Oregon, which
bases their authority on the Secretary of the Interior's power to
make rules and regulations for the Indians.27 These courts have
been severely criticised as incompetent and arbitrary,28 and it
36 Sup. Ct. 696 (1916), holding that the mere fact that the Indian had
become a citizen and subject to state law did not abrogate the United
States authority over him, and that he was still subject to legislation
created for his control and protection.
23 Act of May 8, 1906, 34 STAT. 182 (1906), 25 U. S. C. § 349 (1926).
2424 STAT. 390 (1887), 8 U. S. C. § 3 (1926).
25 See cases cited supra note 22.
26 Eugene Sol Louie v. United States, 274 Fed. 47 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921);
State v. Smokalem, 37 Wash. 91, 79 Pac. 603 (1905); State v. Nimrod, 80
S. D. 239, 138 N. W. 377 (1912). A number of state courts have made
the question of the status of "Indian" turn on whether the individual con-
cerned has severed his tribal relations. State v. Howard, supra note 17;
People v. Ketchum, 73 Cal. 635, 15 Pac. 353 (1887); Minnesota v. Camp-
bell, supra note 18. There is no federal authority for this view.
In Oklahoma, the Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes are by special act
of Congress under the authority of the state as far as responsibility for
crime is concerned. See 30 STAT. 83 (1897); 33 STAT. 573 (1904); of.
Palmer v. Cully, 52 Okla. 454, 153 Pac. 154 (1915).
In spite of the totally different history of the feW remaining Indians of
New York, the state court there has held that it has no jurisdiction over
any of the eight offences designated by the federal statute. People v. Daly,
212 N. Y. 183, 105 N. E. 1048 (1914). It is doubtful, however, if the
courts of that state would hold that they are utterly lacking in jurisdiction
over Indian crimes on the reservations, for New York has in fact exercised
considerable control over the Indians within her borders. See dictum in
Mulkins v. Snow, 232 N. Y. 47, 51, 133 N. E. 123, 124 (1921).
2T United States v. Clapox, 35 Fed. 575 (D. Ore. 1888).
28 See Reservation Courts of Indian Offenses, Hearing on H. R. 7826 be-
fore the Committee on Indian Affairs, House of Representatives, 69th Cong.
1st Sess., which contains many of the conflicting opinions in regard to these
courts.
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must be admitted that they are far different from those to which
we are accustomed to look for standards of procedure and sub-
stantive justice. The regulations of the Indian Bureau of 1904,
which in theory contain the code for guidance of the judges, are
archaic, fragmentary,. and in addition probably unread by nine
out of ten of the Indian judges. In fact the deliberations of the
judges are governed not so much by legal rules and principles as
they are by the cqmmon sense and native intuition of the Indians
who preside over them.29
The writer is inclined to be lenient towards the Courts of Indian
Offences.. It must be remembered that the matters with which
they deal are domestic difficulties, small personal property dis-
putes, and petty offences, such as drunkenness, minor assaults,
and the less gross sexual offences, which while abhorrent to the
morals of more advanced communities are not necessarily con-
sidered such by the majority of Indians. There are also great
numbers of the reservation Indians who have but imperfect com-
mand of the English language, and even less understanding of
the ways of the white man and the white man's laws. For such
cases and for such people, a local court, where without the ex-
pense of hired attorneys the Indians may appear before their
own people and in their own way and in their own tongue have
their cases considered and justice administered, has much to
recommend it. While the power of imprisonment in the hands
of these informal courts may seem dangerous, in actual practice
the sentence means not actual incarceration but a term of labor
about the agency grounds or fields, with generous allowances
for good behavior administered by the superintendent. The truth
seems to be that in general the courts are defective not in the
severity, but in their inability to deal with serious cases of hard-
ened offenders. In fact when a case of this sort arises it is usu-
ally the practice for the superintendent to turn the matter over
to the state or federal authorities, where the way of the unlettered
and impecunious Indian offender may indeed be hard.30 It is
" The writer attended a session of the Court of Indian Offenc6 at the
Pima Indian Reservation in Arizona. One case involved an alleged assault,
and the other a complaint by a mother that the accused Indian was having
illicit relations with her daughter, the parties apparently desiring mar-
riage, to which the mother objected. In the first case the judges found
that both accuser and accused were drunk and sentenced them both to two
months "in jail." In the second case, the offence not being denied, the
accused received a sentence for six months, but the judges declined to
interfere with any desired marriage. The procedure in each case was for
the two judges to call each party and witness before them separately and
alone and ask them to tell the story. One judge served as interrogator and
the other as scribe. After the parties and their witnesses had all been
heard, the judges conferred, agreed on their decision, and announced it
"in open court." The Indian Survey Staff found that this was the usual
procedure, though at some reservations the witnesses were heard openly.
so On a certain reservation on the Pacific coast the incident came to the
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not contended that the Courts of Indian Offences are solutions
of this phase of the Indian legal problem. They are not appro-
priate to the younger educated Indians, too often over-sophisti-
cated in the wiles and crimes of the lower type whites in the
communities surrounding the reservations; but for remote tribal
groups where respect for the older men of the tribe still survives,
and where decent state courts are not reasonably adjacent, they
do play a part in the administration of justice not to be too
harshly condemned.
Civil Justice
While the theory of tribal allegiance and federal guardianship
has served in criminal matters to place the Indian in a special
category, such has not generally been the result in matters of
civil rights. The Indian, whether tribal and a ward of the gov-
ernment or not, may, except where specially restricted by* act of
Congress,31 make contracts, 2 acquire and dispose of property,3
writer's attention of certain Indians who had been unruly and vicious and
exceedingly troublesome to the superintendent. He turned the cases over to
the federal district attorney. In one case an indictment was secured for
assault with intent to rape. The accused Indians were compelled to secure
legal counsel, who demanded $1000 for their services, a sum far beyond the
reach of the accused. Incidentally the crime charged was not within the
jurisdiction of the federal court, but there was no one to present this to
the court in behalf of the accused. Ih a liquor case on this same reserva-
tion the Indians were found guilty and fined $150, and being unable to pay,
spent a month in confinement in the county jail.
31 There are several specific restrictions on the rights of the Indians to
contract. 25 U. S. C. § 68 (1926) forbids any person employed in the Indian
service to have any interest or concern in trade with the Indians. Section
81 makes void any contract with an Indian for services concerning his
lands or claims against the United States unless executed with prescribed
formalities and approved by the Secretary of the Interior. 38 STAT. 97
(1913), 25 U. S. C. § 85 (1926), avoids contracts concerning tribal property
in the hands of the United States unless the consent of the United States
has previously been given. Also where the United States holds title to
Indian allotments in trust, the Indian of course cannot make.any binding
contracts in respect thereto. 24 STAT. 389 (1887), 25 U. S. C. § 348 (1926).
By act of Feb. 27, 1925, it was provided as a measure of protection for
the wealthy Osage Indians of Oklahoma that no contract for debt of any
such Indian not having a special certificate of competence should be valid
unless approved by the Secretary of the Interior. 43 STAT. 1011 (1925).
32 Stacy v. LaBelle, 99 Wis. 520, 75 N. W. 60 (1898) (goods purchased);
Ke-tuc-e-mun-quah v. McClure, 122 Ind. 541, 28 N. E. 1080 (1890) (promis-
sory note); Rubideaux v. Vallie, 12 Kan. 28 (1873) (same); Postoak v.
Lee, 46 Okla. 477, 149 Pac. 155 (1915) (for services rendered) ; Whirlwind
v. Von der Abe, 67 Mo. App. 628 (1896) (recovery by Indian for employer's
breach of contract to hire); In re Stinger Estate, 61 Mont. 173, 201 Pac.
693 (1921) (promissory note); DeNoya v. Hill Investment Co., 33 Okla.
663, 127 Pac. 444 (1912) (same).
33 Rider v. La Clair, 77 Wash. 488, 138 Pac. 3 (1914); McClain v. Miller,
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and sue and be sued in the state or federal courts. 3, In addition,
where his property is held in his behalf in trust by the United
States, the federal government, as well as the Indian, may sue
in respect thereto.- But it has been held that, where there is a
* dispute regardirig the beneficiary rights to lands so held by the
United States, the act of Congress allowing suits in respect
thereto to be brought in the federal courts is exclusive,"0 and
where the questibgn relates to testate or intestate succession the
statute vesting the determination of the question in the Secretary
of the Interior precludes resort to any other tribunal.3 7
With respect to marriage and divorce, however, the Indian is
governed by his own custom and not by state law.
"The general rule is that marriages valid by laws of the coun-
try where they are entered into are binding here, though not
solemnized in accordance with the provisions of our laws; and
the same rule must be adopted in relation to these Indian mar-
riages where the tribal relation still exists. Under the laws of
the United States they are recognized as capable of managing
their own affairs, including their domestic relations, and those
persons who were recognized by the Indian custom and law as
married persons must be so treated by the courts, and their
children cannot be regarded as illegitimate." 3
This, theory has received additional sanction, from the act of
Congress which recognizes as legitimate the offspring of an In-
dian man and woman cohabiting together as man and wife ac-
cording to the Indian customs." Wbile mere sexual relations
do not constitute marriage by Indian custom,° the cases, recog-
95' Kan. 794, 149 Pac. 399 (1915); Bem-Way-Bin-Ness v. Eshelby, 87
Minn. 108, 91 N. W. 291 (1902).
"3M4o. Pac. Ry. v. Cullers, 81 Tex. 382, 17 S. W. 19 (1891) ; Y-Ta-Tah-
Wah v. Rebock, 105 Fed. 257 (C. C. N. D. Iowa 1900); Jones v. Eisler, 3
Kan. 134 (1865) ; Brown v. Anderson, 61 Okla. 136, 160 Pac. 724 (1916) ;
Felix v. Patrick, 145 U. S. 317, 12 Sup. Ct. 862 (1892); Ain-dus-o-hee-shig
v. Beaulieu, 98 Minn. 98, 107 N. W. 820 (1906); Tiger v. Western Invest-
ment Co., 221 U. S. 286, 31 Sup. Ct. 578 (1911).
- Heckman v. United States, 224 U. S. 413, 32 Sup. Ct. 424 (1912);
Bowling v. United States, 233 U. S. 528, 34 Sup. Ct. 659 (1914); United
States v. Board of Commissioners, 251 U. S. 128, 40 Sup. Ct. 100 (1919);
Sunderland v. United States, 266 U. S. 226, 45 Sup. Ct. 64 (1924).
8 McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U. S. 458, 27 Sup. Ct. 346 (1907).
3T Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U. S. 506, 36 Sup. Ct. 202 (1916).
38 See Earl v. Godley, 42 Minn. 361, 362, 44 N. W. 254, 255 (1890).
Accord: La Framboise v. Day, 136 Minn. 239, 161 N. W. 529 (1917); Cyr v.
Walker, 29 Okla. 281, 116 Pac. 931 (1911); Buck v. Branson, 34 0kda. 807,
127 Pac. 436 (1912); Kalyton v. Kalyton, 45 Ore. 116, 74 Pac. 491, 78 Pac.
332 (1903); Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 76 Mich. 498, 43 N. W. 602
(1889); Ortley v. Ross, 78 Neb. 339, 110 N. W. 982 (1907).
a'26 STAT. 795 (1891), 25 U. S. C. § 371 (1926).
o "An irregular, limited, or partial cohabitation is not sufficient to create
a presumption in favor of marriage. It must be continuing and complete,
315.
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nize that under Indian custom marriage and divorce may be
extremely informal. In the case of Proctor v. Foster," the hus-
band, Louis Proctor, a full blooded Creek Indian, started living
with a Creek woman by the name of Sehoke about the year 1884.
They lived together as man and wife and had three children.
But when Sehoke married Louis, she had a ten year old daughter,
and when this daughter grew to womanhood Louis ceased his
marriage relations with Sehoke and commenced cohabitation
with the daughter Ellen. Sehoke in the meantime continued to
live in the same two room house with Louis and Ellen. There
was no evidence of any ceremony of any kind in the making of
these changes, but the Oklahoma court sustained them as Indian
marriages and divorces.42
The Indian Bureau has attempted administratively and through
the Courts of Indian Offences to enforce some compliance by the
Indians with orthodox views of family life, but when the law
recognizes the loose custom marriage, and ignores fornication
and adultery, the task is difficult. It is rendered more perplexing
by the fact that state and federal courts and the Courts of Indian
Offences ordinarily refuse to grant divorces to Indians married
in the customary fashion. Uncas, a blind Apache Indian, was
deserted by his wife, and a small boy whom he hired to lead him
around ran away. He wished to remarry in order to obtain a
helpmate in hi infirmity, but being a Christian Indian and a
government employee, he sought first to secure a divorce from
his faithless wife, but neither the state court nor the reservation
superintendent could help him. Although by so doing he jeop-
ardized his governmental position and his standing in his church,
he took the law into his own hands, and married again by Indian
custom.
The lack of law and law enforcement in so much of the field
in criminal matters, particularly the non-application of the state
laws of marriage and divorce to the Indian wards of the govern-
and such as is usual between persons lawfully married." Fender v. Segro,
41 Okla. 318, 323, 137 Pac. 103, 105 (1913).
41 107 Okla. 95, 230 Pac. 753 (1924).
42 See also remarks of the court in Ortley v. Ross, supra note 38, at 341,
110 N. W. at 983: "The evidence shows that the laws and customs of the
Santee Sioux Indians place slight restrictions on matrimonial alliances be-
tween members of the tribe, that polygamy was practiced with impunity, and
that the only ceremony requisite was a mutual agreement between the
parties to live together as husband and wife, and that this relation might
be dissolved by mutual consent at any time, leaving the parties free to
marry again at pleasure."
The likeness of Indian custom marriage to so-called common-law mar-
riage of our own laws is indicated by the fact that in Oklahoma, where the
state laws apply to the Indians of the Five Civilized Tribes, Indian mar-
riages are sustained as common law marriages. Palmer v. Cully, 52 Okla.
458, 153 Pac. 154 (1915).
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ment, has been greatly deplored. The Board of Indian Commis-
sioners in 1918 viewed with alarm the increased immorality
among the Indians and attributed much of it to the lack of law
just discussed.43 Their recommendations for more specific and
inclusive laws were repeated in later years. There are few who
would admit that the present situation is satisfactory. But dissents
arise when remedies are proposed. There are those who object
to the Courts of Indian Offences as arbitrary and bureaucratic,
and who at times seem to have a naive faith in the elusive phrase,
"due process of law," and in the "right" of these simple, un-
lettered, and impecunious people to be tried by regularly consti-
tuted courts of justice.44 Furthermore, while there is one
group who would remedy immorality and crime among the In-
dian people by a wholesale extension to them of our laws, specifi-
cally those of marriage and divorce, another class see in the
move only a further attempt of a despotic government to rob an
ancient race of its sacred and established family and religious
traditions.45
The writer suggests that in the present situation the great
need is for realism instead of theory and sentiment. No one
solution of the problem is possible, for the Indians of the United
States differ greatly in environment, tribal allegiance, and in the
degree to which they have assimilated our civilization. For those
semi-independent tribes which are considerably removed from
contacts with the outside world and which still retain the Indian
language, customs, and authority, the method of administration
should be as simple, adaptable, 9nd educational as possible. The
report of the Indian Survey Staff " recommends for these groups
the retention of the Courts of Indian Offences for minor civil
cases and misdemeanors. The dangers of executive domination
and discrimination were considered to be outweighed by the ad-
vantages of a local tribunal, composed of Indians, speaking the
Indian tongue, and administering justice according to local un-
derstandings and principles. There should indeed be more definite
regulations governing the courts, and both the parties litigant
43See the published reports of the Board of Indian Commissioners, 1918,
1919, 1923, 1925, 1926.
"See H. R. 9315, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., introduced by Congressman Freer,
which contained among other provisions the following: "That hereafter,
any Indian charged with a crime or misdemeanor against any other Indian
or other person committed on an Indian reservation shall be guaranteed due
process of law." This was aimed at an abolition of the Courts of Indian
Offences.
- See Reservati Courts of Indian Offences, Hearing on H. R. 7826, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess.; 44th ANNUAL REPORT, INDIAN RIGHTS ASSOCIATION (1926);
in both of these places there are stern denunciations of the Courts of Indian
Offences.
"See MERIAM, op. cit. supra note 4, at 777.
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and the court itself should be enabled to transfer cases to the
state or federal courts, if it is deemed that justice may be better
administered there. If, as is strongly urged, expert social work-
ers are placed on the different reservations, a system similar to
our urban juvenile and small claims courts may well be estab-
lished, and more desirable social views gradually inculcated
among the Indians themselves through the medium of their own
tribunals.
For those Indians who are scattered in individual family groups
through large areas peopled predominantly by non-Indians, and
also for those larger bodies who have attained substantially the
knowledge, economic efficiency, and moral responsibility of their
white neighbors, the proper recourse seems to be to the state
and federal courts,47 the latter doubtless having, as at the present,
jurisdiction of the more serious felonies. As the various tribes
develop they should, of course, pass from the first to the second
group, and that this may occur reasonably and promptly, the law
should be framed to permit this to happen through the expedient
of Congress enacting the governing principle, and leaving to the
executive the power to decide, when the facts call for its applica-
tion. Also, when the Indian is placed under the laws of the white
man, there should be a vast strengthening in the forces of legal
aid for the Indians, for many of these inexperienced and impe-
cunious people will suffer, as do the same class of people every-
where, where they are unaided in the courts of law.48
In the matter of substantive law, and this means largely that
governing domestic relations, 'a similar division to that just
proposed should be made. To place Indians of the first class
above mentioned under the state laws of marriage and divorce
will prove either abortive or cruel. Not to place the Indians of
the second class under state or federal laws is to legalize forni-
cation and adultery. Thousands of young people of the Indian
race, though economically incompetent and therefore still govern-
ment wards, have been educated in the governmental schools and
sophisticated by the ways of our so-called civilization. To compel
them to comply with our laws governing family ana social rela-
tions is not an interference with Indian customs and traditions,
for these have ceased to occupy any place in their lives, except as
a convenient excuse for license. The laws of the state should
not at present be extended wholesale to the old tribal groups
where Indian custom and tradition still prevail, but these groups
should nevertheless be gradually educated to a comprehension of
47 It is believed that the better system of criminal law to apply to the
Indian people would be the state law. The federal laws are too specialized
and not sufficiently inclusive to constitute a working criminal code.
48 See MERiAm, op. cit. supra note 4, at 776, 780, for a more complete de-
velopment of a system of legal aid for the Indian people.
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the principles which our laws of marital relations embody. This
might be done by such simple expedients as the registering of the
fact of marriage with the superintendent of the Indian agency,
and the decree of divorce by the Court of Indian Offences. Many
would object to any attempt to change the Indians' moral and
religious views, and the proposition involves the much larger
question of the -government's goal in dealing with the Indian
people. A certain liberality of spirit resents any "Americaniza-
tion" of the Indian, preferring that he be preserved in his ancient
life, culture, government, morals, and religion. There is indeed
much worth preserving, but it must be recognized that an inex-
orable destiny dooms the ancient primitive life of the Indian
before the advance of our modern civilization. What is worthy
and capable of preservation, for example, his crafts, his arts, his
literature, and many would say his religion, should be preserved;
but eventually he will take his place in our economic and social
life, and it is not an arbitrary arrogance which would educate
him so that he may peacefully and profitably dwell in such an
environment.49
INDIAN PROPERTY
Tribal Lands and Funds
A goodly share of the Indian problem to-day centers about his
property. When the nations of Europe laid claim to the continent
of North America by discovery and settlement, they recognized
the possessory rights of the Indian occupants. In an early case
the Supreme Court said:
"One uniform rule seems to have prevailed... ; that friendly
Indians were protected in possession of the lands they occupied,
and were considered as owning them by a perpetual right of
possession in the tribe or nation inhabiting them, as their com-
mon property, from generation to generation, not as the right
of individuals located on particular spots.... Indian possession
or occupation was considered with reference to their habits and
modes of life; their hunting grounds were as much in their actual
possession as the cleared fields of the whites; and their rights
to its conclusive enjoyment in their own way and for their own
purposes were as much respected, until they abandoned them,
made a cession to the government, or an authorized sale to in-
dividuals." 50
This Indian occupancy, however, had to give way to the demands
4See Austin, Why Ame2ricanize the Indian? Forum, September, 1929,
for a sane argument for a preservation of the ancient Indian culture. See
also MERIAM, op. cit. sup ra note 4, at 86-89, for a general statement of the
ultimate goal of work with the Indians.
5o Mitchel v. United States, 9 Pet. 711, 745 (U. S. 1835).
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of the immigrants from Europe for more land, and the United
States by treaty of cession with the tribes acquired this occu-
pancy right in return for money, chattels, and a confirmation
to the tribe of a new location. But as the new reservations were
in turn being demanded by the pressure of the westward moving
white population the Indian found himself again and again moved
to still more remote and barren places.51 In the case of some of
the tribes of the arid southwest, such as the Pueblos, Navajos,
Papagoes, and Pimas, their reservations are their ancestral
homes, confirmed to them by statute or treaty, while in other
cases the Indians occupy lands set apart for them out of the
public domain by executive order based on Congressional author-
ization.
But although the sacredness of the right of the Indian to his
lands has often been declared, the right of ownership is not his,
for the fee title to the lands is in the United States, which holds
such lands in trust for its Indian wards.52  In such capacity it
51 In Leavenworth R. R. v. United States, 92 U. S. 733, 743 (U. S. 1875),
Davis, J., said: "The United States has frequently bought the Indian title
to make room for civilized men,-the pioneers of the wilderness--but it has
never engaged in advance to do so, nor was constraint, in theory at least,
placed upon the Indians to bring about their acts of cession."
The Court does well to state that constraint in theory was not used. The
history of the government's treaty making with the Indians is not a chapter
of whibh to be proud. An example may be given. The United States had
"under the most solemn guarantee" provided for the Cherokee Indians a
permanent home that should never "be embarrassed by having extended
around it the lines or placed over it the jurisdiction of a territory or State."
The United States failed in numerous attempts to get the Indians to con-
sent to a dissolution of the tribal government and the consequent opening
up of their territory to white settlement. Finally by act of June 28, 1898,
30 STAT. 495, Congress made direct provision for such dissolution and open-
ing, but provided that if the Indians prior to the going into effect of this
statute ratified certain tentative agreements theretofore made between the
commissioners of the United States and of the tribe, that the act of Con-
gress should not apply. See MILL, OKLAHOMA INDIAN LAND LAWS (1924)
c. 1, for a short history of the opening of Indian Territory; MCLAUGHLIN,
My FRIEND THE INDIAN (1910) c. 16, 17, for an account of the methods by
which land cessions were obtained.
In Heckman v. United States, supra note 35, at 428, 32 Sup. Ct. at 425,
there is a short account of the transactions by which Cherokee Indians were
removed from southeastern United States into what is now Oklahoma, and
their lands finally opened to white settlement. See also Goodrich, The
Legal Status of the California Indian (1926) 14 CALIF. L. REv. 83, 157, for
an account of the merciless treatment accorded the Indian of that state by
the early settlers and the faithlessness of Congress in the situation.
52 In the case of the Cherokee nation the United States had issued a
patent in fee. Nevertheless the United States exercised over such land Its
powers of guardianship. Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 294, 23
Sup. Ct. 115 (1902). The executive order reservations were ruled by Mr.
Justice Stone while Attorney General not to come within the designation
of the words "the public domain" in a statute authorizing the leasing of
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holds, protects, improves, leases, and sells the Indian properties.
If there be income from the land, it is collected by the govern-
ment, and either preserved in a fund for the Indian owners, or
disbursed to them as Congress in its wisdom has seen fit to
provide.33
This discretionary and paternalistic power of the government
over the Indian property has often been delegated by Congress
to the executive. Thus the General Allotment Act of 1887 "1 au-
thorizes the President, whenever in his opinion a reservation
may advantageously be used for agricultural and grazing pur-
poses, to allot it in severalty to the individual members of the
tribe owning the reservation, and to negotiate with the tribe for
the purchase by the United States of the unalloted portion of the
lands, such agreement of purchase to be subject, however, to
Congressional approval. Authority is given to the Secretary of
the Interior to execute leases of tribal lands for mining pur-
poses,5 5 and also to sell the timber located on such landsYG While
in some cases the Indian tribe or council may lease or sell its
lands, such sales are subject to the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior.5 7
The question of the government's power and responsibility
in dealing with Indian lands is almost invariably treated as a
political one, concerning which the courts will not take jurisdic-
tion. But the United States may be made liable for breaches of
trust in cases where it has submitted itself to the jurisdiction of
the Court of Claims,5 8 and the administration may be enjoined
from confiscation of Indian property in a manner unauthorized
by statute.59
such lands for oil and gas. He assimilated such lands to Indian reserva-
tions in the usual sense in which the customary relation of the United
States and the Indians existed. 34 Op. Att'y Gen. 171, 181 (1924).
53 There is no uniformity in this respect. The practice varies according
to the different tribes and the special acts of Congress applicable to each.
Often the matter is complicated by treaty provisions.
5424 STAT. 388 (1887), 25 U. S. C. § 331 (1926), also known as the
Dawes Act.
5541 STAT. 31, 1231 (1919, 1921), 25 U. S. C. § 399 (1926). The statute
gives this authority only in case of reservations located in certain specified
states, which include, however, within their boundaries a considerable part
of the Indian peoples.
56 36 STAT. 857 (1910), 25 U. S. C. § 407 (1926).
5726 STAT. 795 (1891), 43 STAT. 244 (1924), 25 U. S. C. §§ 397, 398,
398a-402a (1926); 44 STAT. 1347 (1927).
58 See United States v. Mille Lac Chippewas, 229 U. S. 498, 509, 33 Sup.
Ct. 811, 812 (1913).
z9 Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U. S. 110, 39 Sup. Ct. 185 (1919).
It is also provided by law that an individual Indian claiming the right to
an allotment of tribal land may sue for such allotment in the United States
courts. See 36 STAT. 1167 (1911), 25 U. S. C. § 345 (1926).
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An adjudicated case will show the extent of the government's
irresponsible power over Indian property. In Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock,'" it appeared that the United States had made a treaty
with the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache Indians, by which it set
aside a reservation for their use. By the terms of this treaty no
cession of the lands of the reservation was to be valid unless
signed by three-fourths of the adult males of the reservation.
Later an agreement was signed between the Indians and com-
missioners representing the United States to partition a portion
of the reservation among the individual members of the tribe
and to cede the remainder to the United States for A cash consid-
eration. Congress passed acts to carry the agreement into effect,
not, however, without various changes in the agreement. The
Indians repudiated the agreement, alleging fraud in the negotia-
tions, an inadequate price for the ceded area; and a failure to
secure the signatures of three-fourths of the adult males of the
tribe. This last contention was admitted to be true by the Sec-
retary of the Interior. But the Supreme Court refused to inter-
fere at the suit of the protesting Indians. It said:
"The contention in effect ignores the status of the contracting
Indians, and the relation of dependency they bore and continue
to bear towards the government of the United States. To uphold
the claim would be to adjudge that the indirect operation of the
treaty was to materially limit and qualify the controlling author-
ity of Congress in respect to the care and protection of the In-
dians and to deprive Congress, in a possible emergency, when
the necessity might be urgent for a partition and disposal of the
tribal lands, of all the power to act, if the assent of the Indians
could not be obtained.
"Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has
been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power
has always been deemed a political one, not subject to be con-
trolled by the judicial department of the government ...
"In view of the legislative power possessed by Congress over
treaties with the Indians and Indian tribal property, we may not
specially consider the contentions pressed upon our notice that
the signing by the Indians of the agreement of October 6, 1892,
was obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations and concealment,
that the requisite three fourths of adult male Indians had not
signed as required by the twelfth article of the treaty of 1867,
and that the treaty as signed had been amended by Congress
without submitting such amendments to the action of the In-
dians, since all these matters in any event were solely within the
domain of the legislative authority and its action is conclusive
upon the Courts ...
"Indeed, the controversy which this case presents is concluded
by the decision in Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U. S. 294
decided at this term, where it was held that full administrative
power was possessed by Congress over Indian tribal property.
In effect, the action of Congress now complained of was but
60 187 U. S. 553, 23 Sup. Ct. 216 (1903).
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exercise of such power, a mere change in the form of the invest-
ment of Indian tribal property, the property of those, who as we
have held were in substantial effect the wards of the government.
We -must presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in
the dealing with the Indians of which complaint is made and that
the legislative branch of the government exercised its best judg-
ment in the premises. In any event, as Congress possessed full
power in the matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire into
the motives which prompted the enactment of this legislation." 0,
Claims against the Government
An asset deemed of great importance, but in fact a veritable
Jarndyce v. Jarndyce to many Indians, are their tribal claims.
Breaches of treaty and seizures of land by the federal authorities
in past years have given rise to many vast claims 1-2 against the
government. Many of the Indian people are wasting their time
and energies in vain longings for the wealth which they expect
the allowance of their claims will give. However, there is no
general right to sue the government, and because of the Statute
of Limitations, the consent to be sued in the Court of Claims is
invariably inoperative. An act must be secured from Congress
giving the court jurisdiction to entertain a suit. If the statute
be liberal in permitting claims to be considered, then the court's
investigation -will take a wide scope, while if the act is limited,
so also must be the investigation. It has not been always easy to
secure jurisdictional acts 3 As they call for the payment of
aIbi. 564, 23 Sup. Ct. at 221. In the cited case of Cherokee Nation v.
Hitchcock, supra note 52, the Court refused to entertain a bill by the Chero-
kee Nation to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from leasing, under the
authority of acts of Congress, tribal deposits of oil, gas, coal, and other
minerals, which leases were contended to be contrary to the treaty rights
of the Indians, and an infringement on their fee title to the lands which
had been granted to them by previous acts of Congress. The Court said:
"We are not concerned in this case with the question whether the act of
June 28, 189E, and the proposed action thereunder, which is complained of,
is or is not wise and calculated to operate beneficially to the interests of
the Cherokee. The power existed in Congress to administer upon and guard
the tribal property, and the power being political and administrative in its
nature, the manner of its exercise is a question within the province of the
legislative branch to determine, and is not one for the courts." Ibid. 308,
23 Sup. Ct. at 120.
This guardianship is not incompatible with citizenship in the Indian.
Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 221 U. S. 286, 31 Sup. Ct 578 (1911).
62 The claim of the Sioux Indians for lands unlawfully taken by the
United States, including the famous gold mining region in the Black Hills
of South Dakota, is estimated at eight hundred and fifty million dollar.
63 A jurisdictional act for the Indians of California for their claim for
lands seized from them in the days of 1849, and concerning which treaties
were made but suffered to lapse unratified in the United States Senate, was
first officially presented to Congress in 1920. It did not pass until 1928.
23
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money they must be approved both by the Department of the
Interior and the Budget Board, and frequently bills have been
rejected as "contrary to the president's financial policy" of econ-
omy, though the writer had not supposed that economy should
rightfully include a refusal to pay one's lawful debts. Even when
a jurisdictional act has been secured, the situation of the United
States is not that of ordinary defendant, for the claimant's choice
of an attorney and the terms of its contract are subject to de-
partmental approval, and usually those terms include a grant to
the Commissioner and Secretary of the Interior of power to
supervise and direct the litigation 4.6  While the government's
adverse interest as defendant and its trust interest as guardian
necessarily conflict, it is a situation hard to avoid, for to allow
the tribes to contract freely with their .attorneys would without
doubt lead to many unconscionable bargains with attorneys will-
ing to profit by Indian credulity and simplicity.1 Although there
is much complaint by Indian attorneys, which is probably justi-
fied, concerning the small remuneration allowed, there is but
little to show that the government has not fairly carried out its
difficult dual role.
The Court of Claims is in many ways an ideal body to handle
Indian claims, proceeding as it does entirely on documentary
evidence and depositions. The present necessity of securing from
Congress a jurisdictional act for each claim, however, is unfor-
tunate, for it introduces too many political considerations into
what should be purely judicial questions. Inequality and injus-
tice frequently result. While there has been in the past few
years a great increase in the number of permissions granted to
Indian tribes to sue on their claims, those remaining should be
speedily settled. It is suggested that the appointment of an
expert commission to investigate the remaining claims and to
report to Congress on their probable validity, together with
recommendations for jurisdictional acts, would do as much as
anything to satisfy many Indians of the government's good faith
in de&aling with them, and until this is accomplished, work for
and with them will b" futile .6
It will be many years more before a final judgment can be rendered by the
Court of Claims.
U4See 16 STAT. 570 (1871), 25 U. S. C. § 81 (1926).
65 There are, in some states, parties collecting large sums from the Indians
under promise of prosecuting their claims and of eventually making them
all wealthy. They constitute a serious obstacle to those who seek to do
serious welfare work with the Indians.
6G On the general subject of Indian tribal claims see Wise, Indian Law
and Necded Reforms (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 37. See also, LEUPP, TiE INDIAN
AND His PROBLEM (1910) 194 et seq.; MERIAM, op. cit. supra note 4, at 805.
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Individual Indian Property
The executive not only dominates over tribal assets, but also
over the individual allotments into which most of the reserva-
tions have been divided. With the naive trust that making the
Indian an individual land holder would banish his primitive
racial instincts and transform him into a self-sustaining and
satisfied agriculturist,+6 the government in 1887 provided for the
allotment, at the discretion of the President, of the reservations
suitable for agriculture to the members of tle various tribes in
individual tracts of which the standard was eighty acres of agri-
cultural land.6 But the grant ia not absolute, for the United
States continues to hold the title in trust for twenty-five years,
a period which the President "may in any case in his discretion
extend." o The Secretary of the Interior is also authorized in
his discretion, if satisfied that the Indian allottee is competent
to manage his own affairs, to grant a patent in fee, which of
course has the effect of removing all restrictions on the holding.10
While the Indian may select his own allotment - and may even
by special enactment sue the United States in the District Court
to enforce his claims theretot 2 he has no right to sell, lease, or
encumber his land, except by the consent of the government or
its designated officers.3 Also, in the event of a sale or lease,
the Secretary of the Interior has a discretion whether to pay to
the Indian the proceeds, or to disburse them for him through the
Department.-+ In addition, "whenever it shall be made to appear
to the Secretary of the Interior that by reason of age, disability,
or inability, any allottee cannot personally and with benefit to
himself occupy or improve his allotment or any part thereof, the
same may be leased" for five years for farming purposes by the
Secretary upon such terms as he may prescribe.73
67 See LEuPP, op. cit. supra, note 66, at 23, 33, 61, for an account of the
allotting acts breaking up the reservations and distributing them to the
individual members of the tribes.
68 24 STAT. 388 (1887), 25 U. S. C. § 331 (1926). In the case of grazing
land the standard allotment is 160 acres, and in the case of irrigable land
40 acres. On many reservations these quantities are varied, as the allot-
ment was made under special acts and not under the general allotment act.
6924 STAT. 389 (1887), 31 STAT. 1085 (1901), 25 U. S. C. § 348 (1926).
7024 STAT. 390 (1887), 34 STAT. 182 (1906), 25 U. S. C. § 349 (1926).
7124 STAT. 388 (1887), 25 U. S. C. § 332 (1926). If the Indian fails to
make a selection within four years, then it is the duty of the superintendent
of the reservation to make one for him.
7228 STAT. 305 (1894), 31 STAT. 760 (1901), 25 U. S. C. §§ 3.15, 46
(1926).
73 See 34 STAT. 1018 (1907), 35 STAT. 444 (1908), 35 STAT. 783 (1909),
36 STAT. 856, 857 (1910), 25 U. S. C. §§ 396, 403-406 (1926).
74 Ibid.
- 31 STAT. 229 (1900), 39 STAT. 128 (1916), 25 U. S. C. § 394-395 (1926).
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The executive power which controls the allottee also follows
him beyond the grave, for the determination of the heirs of the
deceased landholder, although according to the law of the state
where the land is located, is committed to the Secretary of the
Interior, "upon notice and hearing under such rules as he may
prescribe. . . and his decision thereon shall be final and con-
clusive." 76 While the Indian may make a will "in accordance
with the regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the
Interior," it has no force and effect unless approved by him, the
statute providing no rules to govern his discretion in this
matter.
77
The regulations which the Secretary is thus authorized to
promulgate, while very complete as to procedural matters, are
either vague or entirely lacking in substantive provisions. For
example, there is no authority in the published regulations for
the allowance of claims against decedents, although such claims
are customarily received and disposed of, each case being appar-
ently considered on its own merits. There are no mandatory
provisions in regard to the execution of wills, except that they
may not be oral. While attesting witnesses are contemplated,
they do not appear to be essential. Such matters as mental com-
petency, undue influence, the omission of children, the effect of
the death of a devisee are entirely undefined, and it does not ap-
pear that there is settled practice in any of them. At times
certain Assistant Secretaries of the Interior in charge of Indian
matters exercised the power of disapproving wills not for illegal-
ity alone, but because deemed unwise or improvident, though
when the writer made his study of the work of the Bureau, the
then Assistant Secretary accorded to the Indian testator the right
to make the same disposition of his property as any other citizen
in his right mind could make.
To carry out the task of determining heirs and probating wills,
there is in the Indian Bureau a probate division, consisting of
so-called inheritance examiners, who go into the field to secure
the evidence, and an office force which receives the reports of
the examiners and either approves or rejects them. Normally
each Indian probate passes through the hands of seven persons,
and while the more important and interesting cases get very
good attention, for there are high class lawyers in the solicitor's
office of the Department of the Interior, in general Indian heir-
ship and testamentary proceedings are blessed with too many
initials, and too few intellects.
Many object to this executive handling of what is ordinarily.
76 See supra note 69; also 36 STAT. 855 (1910), 25 U. S. C. § 372 (1926);
Hallowell v. Commons, supra note 37.
7736 STAT. 856 (1910), 37 STAT. 678 (1913), 25 U. S. C. § 373 (1926).
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entrusted to courts of law, but it is doubtful if any other
method would be effective. The assets of most of these estates
consist of real estate in remote and inaccessible places. The
heirs of the inheritance may be widely scattered, and since they
can usually enjoy whatever possession they need of the land
without probate proceedings, it is necessary for the government,
if it is to keep the title to these lands clear, to go into the Indian
country, search out the heirs and witnesses, and make its findings
with very little assistance from the natural claimants to the
estate? No probate court could or would do this work. If com-
petent men, who do not need constant review of their work,
are secured, and if these men are aided by reasonably complete
and definite regulations covering the substantive law of the sub-
ject, and if court review is granted to correct errors of law and
abuses of discretion, administrative handling of the probate
work seems the only feasible method.
Criticism
The above brief -review of the federal government's power
over the property of its Indian wards cannot fail to strike one
with its arbitrary and almost unrestrained character. It has
been sharply challenged by critics of the government's policy,
who claim that in the administration of its trust the government
has been not only negligent but positively unfaithful. The items
of the indictment are many. It is said that public improve-
ments have been made, the expense of which is made a charge
on the Indian's property, the benefit of which inures chiefly to
the white population of the state.m A bill which was introduced
with the claimed approval of the Indian Bureau to settle a long
standing land controversy between the Pueblo Indians of New
Mexico and certain squatters on their lands aroused a storm
of protest from many groups friendly to the Indians, and a more
favorable substitute was procured.", Secretary Fall proposed to
lease certain executive order Indian reservations for oil and
gas on the ground that they were a part of the public domain
and not properly Indian lands. Under the law, if the Secre-
tary were correct, none of the revenue would go to the Indians.
The Attorney General, however, reversed this decision, holding
that such lands were not part of the public domain, and not
leasable at all. The Indian Commissioner then procured the
introduction in Congress of a bill authorizing leasing, but giving
T See Collier, op. cit. supra note 1, at 453, 474, in regard to the highway
bridge near Phoenix, Arizona, constituting a charge against the property
of the Pima tribe, and the highway bridge at Lee's Ferry, Arizona, made a
charge against the Navajos.
79 See Bynner, From Him That Hath Not, Outlook, Jan. 17, 1923.
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to the state 371/2% of the royalties in lieu of taxes. Again
private individuals, friends of the Indian, secured a new meas-
ure which took no part of the Indian revenue, but simply made
the prospective lessees' property and the Indians' royalties tax-
able by the state as other property was taxed by it.80 A pro-
posal to lease a certain valuable power site on the Flathead
Indian reservation in Montana has been bitterly opposed and
denounced, as not falling short of confiscation. Similar conten-
tions are being made concerning proposed contracts between
an irrigation district near Albuquerque, New Mexico, and the
government acting as guardian for the Pueblo Indians, and
eminent counsel have been retained by private parties to defend
the interests of the Indians. The most celebrated case, involving
individual Indian property, is that of Jackson Barnett, an aged,
illiterate, and simple minded Cherokee, who had become pos-
sessed of millions through the fortunate discovery of oil on his
land. A gift of $1,100,000 to his white wife and the American
Baptist Home Mission Society, effective after hi death, was
approved by the Indian Commissioner, but set aside by the
United States District Court on the ground that it was evident
that the Indian donor did not have sufficient mentality to under-
stand the nature of his immense donation.8 1 On the Yuma reserva-
tions in Southern California there was a long and constant
turmoil, with investigation after investigation arising out of
charges of fraud in the leasing of Indian lands, and one employee
was dismissed because of proven derelictions.
It is not merely on account of the actual financial loss, how-
ever, that the present system is attacked. It cannot be doubted
that the withdrawal from the Indian owners of all control over
their property is a serious injury to their racial pride, and all
but destructive of any sense of initiative and thrift.8 2 This is
particularly so, when as has been too often the case, the execu-
tives in charge of Indian property, irritated by the importunings
of their charges, and deeming explanations futile, assume a
superior, domineering, and almost insulting attitude, and vouch-
safe no information to the Indian owners conceriing their prop-
erty, and the government's plans in regard thereto. That the
Indians resent this cannot be denied. At a hearing attended by
the writer before a former Commissioner of Indian Affairs,
relative to the proposed leasing of an Indian power site, the
80 Act of March 3, 1927, 44 STAT. 1347 (1927), 25 U. S. C. § 398a-e (1928).
See hearings before sub-committee of the Committee on Indian Affairs of
the House of Representatives on H. R. 9133, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., Feb. 19,
1926.
61 Cf. Barnett v'. Equitable Trust Co., 21 F. (2d) 325 (S. D. N. Y. 1927).
82 See MCLAUGHLIN, op. cit. supra note 51, last chapter, "Give the Red
Man his Portion."
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Indian representative made it quite clear that his people did
not object to the leasing, but that they did feel that the tribe
should at least be consulted in regard to it. Another intelligent
Indian in the writer's presence expressed a similar view in re-
gard to the governmental management of Indian timber property,
when he said that if mistakes were to be made in the handling
of his assets, he would prefer to make those mistakes himself,
rather than to have another make them for him.
While the present condition creates an atmosphere in which
distrust and hate are bound to breed, the writer doubts whether
in recent years there have been many cases of actionable fraud.
The great danger is that a bureaucratically organized and
politically controlled body like the Indian Bureau will in cases
of conflict between the interests of the Indians and those of
their white neighbors tend to compromise the claims of its in-
articulate and unsophisticated wards, as an escape from the per-
sistent demands of their opponents, often represented in Congress
by politically powerful Congressmen and Senators, whose ill will
cannot lightly be incurred.
Many suggestions have been made concerning the Indian
property problem. The proposal that all guardianship be re-
leased, and that the lands and funds of these still simple and
untutored people be turned over to them, free from govern-
mental control, would leave them, as has been proved too often
in the past, the helpless prey of merciless and unscrupulous
land traders.83 The remedy may cure the ill, but it would all
but kill the patient, and it is difficult to understand how any
but the most heartless can seriously consider it. Many, feeling
a deep resentment against the Indian Bureau and its methods,
would substitute state control for the federal guardianship, but
many of the states have proved to be, and doubtless still are,
the Indians' worst enemies 8 Also, the federal government's
83 In Oklahoma the governmental policy had been to release the Indians
of the Five Civilized Tribes from federal guardianship as much as possible.
The result was a reign of unexampled fraud and thievery upon the ignorant
Indian landholders. At the present time the plight of many of these Indians
is the most pitiable of any in the United States. See IEnt I, op. cit.
supra note 4, at 94.
84 This has been the case in Oklahoma. In New Mexico it seemed to be
the unanimous opinion that the large Mexican population in that state could
not be trusted with any control over the Indian or hi property. As far as
educational, medical, and social work with the Indians is concerned, many
of the more progressive states with existing organizations for this work
can undoubtedly better accomplish this task than the federal government.
Minnesota and Wisconsin are already officially doing considerable relief
work for the Indians. California has passed an act authorizing the state
to expend in educational and welfare work for the Indians whatever appro-
priation may be made to it by Congress for that purpose, and has urged
Congress to make such appropriations.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
organization and records are too valuable to be scrapped. The
plausible suggestion has been made that the administration of
Indian property should be under the control of the federal courts.
The formation of trusts to administer Indian property is also
proposed. This reliance on the protection afforded by courts of
law and legal institutions seems to the writer rather sanguine.
The tribal properties are vast, varied, and scattered. The prob-
lems concerning them involve economic, social, and political con-
siderations, calling not so much for rules of law and the judg-
ment of law-trained men as for an administrative personnel of
ability, integrity, and human sympathy. On these officials the
courts would necessarily rely, and no great advance would be
obtained over the present situation, under which a court of
equity will give injunctive relief in cases of violations of law
by administrative officials, while the Congressional forum is
always open to those dissenting from the government's policy.
The administrative method of handling Indian property seems
to the writer inevitable, but for its proper success there are
several requisites. First, the laws and regulations concerning
Indian property should be rewritten with these dual ends in
view: one, of preventing fraud and fears of fraud, through the
keeping of clear and public records of each step in the handling
of Indian assets; and two, of training the Indian people in eco-
nomic management through an acquaintance with the principal
details concerning their property, and through an actual par-
ticipaton where possible in the decisions relating thereto. This
last objective might perhaps be accomplished through the crea-
tion of corporations to take over many tribal properties, and
the inclusion on the governing boards thereof of representatives
from the Indian owners.8 5 An adequate legal department within
the Indian Bureau under the supervision of a general counsel
would be a great aid in preventing outside aggressions, and in
giving aid and counsel to the Commissioner in the many im-
portant legal questions presented to him.8 Of supreme im-
portance, however, is to have in the office of Indian Commis-
sioner a person thoroughly sympathetic with the Indian race
and its aspirations, zealous to protect and advance them, and
removed as far as possible from the entanglements of politics.
His character and attitude should be reflected in all members of
the service, particularly those who come into first hand con-
tact with the Indian people. The problem is not so much one of
systems and organizations, as it is one of human understanding
and personality.
85 See MERIAM, (, it. supra note 4, at 462-466, for a concrete suggestion
as to the application of the corporate form for tribal properties.
86 Ibid. 780.
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CONCLUSION
In the beginning of this article the statement was made that
the Indian problem is largely one of race conservation and ad-
vancement. This means, in the large, education, including not
merely a common school or vocational training for children, but
a process by which young and old, individual and family, com-
munity and nation, shall be taught how to live and prosper in
the increasingly' complex society into which the rapidly turning
wheels of fate have brought the Indian people. There is a real
danger that good people, incensed by the wrongs that have been
done the Indian, will, by stridently demanding that he be given
his "rights," ignore the educational task before the American
people in preserving and advancing the Indian race. The Indian
people are a great and lovable race, and certainly capable of
so-called advancement. But it must not be forgotten that they
are but a generation or so removed from barbarism. A few
years ago the greater part of them were living the lives of
nomads, grossly ignorant of the laws, customs, and morals of that
race which was to drive them from their ancestral domains
and leave them dependent on others for maintenance. We can-
not expect that in the few decades that have since passed they
are now in a position to enjoy the benefits and receive the pro-
tection of a system of law and government designed for the
needs of our own advanced civilization.
Administrative direction and special law must needs still exist.
The "rights" which we would confer upon them would carry
correlative duties, and particularly in property matters would
prove disastrous. Equality before the law may mean annihila-
tion. The majority of these people are not able either in under-
standing or financial ability to take advantage of the courts of
justice, against which many more advanced suitors still bitterly
complain. As in the juvenile courts we have been compelled to
abandon reliance on criminal codes, technical procedure, and bills
of rights in dealing with the problems of minors, so very well
may the same be necessary in dealing with this race, still in its
minority in cultural and economic progress. The emphasis must
be on education, not on the granting of rights. In the great task
of leading the Indian people to a position of independence and
respect, the rule of law must not be made the end of our efforts,
but accepted in its true role as but one of the servants in that
larger and more comprehensive work.
